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This paper investigates the iu0urnu of habit formation and preference interdependence
on labour supply behaviour of married females. A novelty of the paper is that we incorporate
direct survey information on reference groups of individuals in a neoclassical labour aupply
modeL For that purpose we first estimate a latent variables model relating the direct
iníormation to the "true" but unobserved reference groups.
One of the most interesting features ot the model is that the presence oïyoung children
becomea an insignificant factor in the hours equation while it remains a aignificant factor
in the participation decision. In addition, the labor supply curve is much flatter in a model
with habit formation and preference interdependence than in a model without it. Both
habit formation and preference interdependence contribute significantly to the explanation
ot female labour supply.
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to incorporate preference interdependence and habit forma-
tion into a neodassical model of female labour supply. We allow for the fact that individuals
may get used to working a certain number of hours per week (habit formation) and that the
number of hours they prefer Lo work may depend on the number of hours othet people work
(interdeperedence of preferences). flabit formation and preference interdependence will be re-
ícrred to jointly as preference fornaation 1. Labour supply behaviour of individuals is analysed
within a generalized Tobit framework. We allow for the possibility that the labour supply
function is discontinuous at zero hours. The data we use pertain to married females in Dutch
houscholds in 198.5.
The notion that preferences may be endogenous has gained some foothold in the literature
on consumer detuand equations (see e.g., Yollak (1970, 1976), Phlips (1984), Gaertnet (1974),
Blanciforti and Green (19R3), Darrough, Pollak and Wales (19R3) and Alessie and Kapteyn
(1991)), but hardly any in the empirical labour supply literature. In consumer demand models,
habit formation is usually the only component of preference formation that is taken into account
in empirical analyses (habit formation may then be either rational or myopic, ct Muellbauer
(1988)). In a few papers, Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) and Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt
and Wansbeek (1997) have also incorporated pteference interdependence into empir;cal models
of consumption following theu,etical notionc developed by Garrtner (197'1) and Pollak (1976).
Lr Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) and ten Ifacken et al. (1989) the framework developed in the
two former papers is extended to deal with household labour supply.
In these papers parameters ofindividual (or household) utility functions are made dependent
on a weigthed mean of consumption levels or hours worked by others in society. 1'he weights
used in constructing such means are called "reference weights". This terminology refers to
the notion of a socin( reJerence group, which can be defined roughly as the set of people
whose behaviour influences the individual's preferences. For the special case where every'one in
society has the same reference group and utility depends on average total expenditures, Oswald
(7983) has investigated the implications for optimal non-linear taxation. In a somewhat related
approach, Blomquist. (1993) studies labour supply in the case where preferences for leisure and
consumption depend on the mean number of hours worked in society and on mean consumption.
tle investigates the effect of taxes on labour supply and compares the effect of a tax change with
and without accounting for the interdependence of preferences. Not surprisingly, he finds that
a neglect of interdependence may yield substantially biased predictions of the labour supply
effects ot a tax change.
There are ofcourse much more general ways of relating individual preferences to the behavior
of others than just to some average. In particular the notion of relativity has been pursued by
various authors. In Rapteyn (19ï7) the idea is put forward that individual utility functions are
idenli~ca! to a perceived consumption distribution. Later work (e.g., Van de Stadt, Kapteyn,
Van de Geer (1985), Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1985)) appears to corroborate this hypothesis
quite sttongly. Ok and Ko~kesen (199fi) provide a more general theory of the representation
of interdependent preferences, of which complete relativity is a special case. Cole, Mailath,
and fostlewaitc (1995) generate a concern for relativity in a ver}' different manner. In their
model, agents have identical utility fundions but different endowments. In particular, ma]es are
exogenously endowed with a certain amount of wealth, whereas females differ in productivity in
' Rather than the terms habit formation and preference interdependence, f3ecker (1996) uses the Lerms pereonal
capifo( and ~ocia( capila(.the la.bor market. "I'he e(fort expended by a female deterrnines with what male she can match,
aft.er which they consume their goods jointly. `['his touniament for males induces a concern for
relativity by the females when deciding how much effort to expend. One should note that in
this model, considerations of relat.ivity do not stem frotn a structure of preferences, but rather
from the structure of the institutions in socicty.
Interdependence of preferences will most likely iníluence the equilibrium distribution of
wages. As an example, Frank (1984) considers a case where workers care about their relative
incorne compared to their co-workers. [t is found that an ectuilibrium distribution of wages
within firms is less dispersed than if such interdependence does not exist. The reason for
this finding is that workcrs with the lower marginal productivity need to be paid above their
marginal product to compensate for the disutility of working with ot.hers who make more money.
Conversely, the workers with the higher marginal product receive part of their compensation in
kind, due to the fact that they can compare themselves with lower paid colleagues. Clark and
Oswald (1996) provide evidence of thc importance of comparison wage rates. They employ self
reported measures ofjob satisfaction and find that this measure is best explained by own wa~ge
(with has a positive effect) in combination with comparison earnings (obtained as predicted
earnings from a conventional earnings equation). Comparison earnings have a negative effect
on job satisfaction. If comparison earnings is omitted, own income has no appreciable effect
on job sa,tisfaction.
Neumark and f'ostlewaite (1995) iul.~uiluce relnlivity concerns in a mndel t)I female labor
participation by assuming that families dc,rive additional utilty from having a higer income
than compaaison families. They show that this induces secondary effects of rising wages on
female labor force participation. The primary efíect is the usual effect of higher wages on labor
force participation. }lowever, if some females decide to start working in the labot market as a
result of higher wages, their family's income will increase and thereb,y they may "jump over"
the income of comparison families. This may induce the females in these comparison families
to to also start working, to restore the original ordering in family incomes.
In the current paper we adopt the framework of Kapteyn and N'oittiez (1990), where ref-
erence group means of female hours enter into the utitilty function of a female. In the paper
ment.ioned these reference group means are constructed by ma.king specific assumptions about
the unknown reference weights. The estimation results showed an overwhelming influence of
habit formation, relative to preference interdependence, but also preference interdependence
proved to be a significant factor in labour supply. Yet, the estimation results were not very
satisfactor,y. In many cases parameter estimates had to be constrained by an upper (one) or
]ower (zero) limit.
In the present pa.per a more sophisticated method is used for the construction of the social
reference group variables. Here we make use of direct infonnation on reterence groups available
in the data used, to construct a nurnber of indicators for the mea,n hours worked and the mean
participation rate in an individual's reference group. The observed indicators are next related
to the latent "true" reference group means by means of a factor analytic model.
In Section 2 we briefly discuss how preference formation can be incorporated into a neo-
classical labour supply model. ln Section 3 we present the factor analytic model describing
the relation of the indicators to the "true" rcference group variables. Section 4 shows the
estimation results of the factor analvtic modeL In Section 5 we discuss how the estimation
results of the [actor anal,ytic model can be exploited to anal,yse the role of reference groups
in labour supply. In Section 6 the estimation results of the resulting labour supply model are
given. Section 7 concludes.3
2 A labour supply model with preference formation
We consider females in households with at least two adults capable of working in paid jobs. VVe
shall refer to such individuals as married fernales. Our a.im is to model the number oí hours
married females would like to work, i.e. their "desired number of hours." Desired hours are
elicited through a survey question. The phrasing of the survey question ( see Section 4 below)
allows ns to take the labour supply of any person in the household other than the married
female as exogenous. 'I'he labour supply of the married fetnale is assumed to be consistent with
the (ollowing model
hk - ijOk f Íjl ~k f Q2wk f Íj37~~k f Ehkr (1)
Where
hk - number of hours the fe~tnale in household k would Gkc to work per week,
ack - after tas wage rate of the femalc in household k,
!k -(weekly) nonlabour income of the female in household k, including all incomes of other
household members,
Qok, Q~ , Í~2 and (33 are parameters,
chk are i.i.d. error terms with mean zero and variance ah.
I;quation ( 1) is a reparameterization of a modified version of the model introduced by Hausman
and Rtmd (1984). Labour supply is made a yuadratic function of wages. The obvious advantage
of a quadratic specification over a linear one (which is used for instance by Hausman (1980,
1985) and Blomquist ( 1983)) is that it is more flexible.
At this point we deviate from the standard Tobit model b,y allowing the participation
decision to bc different from the hours of work decision. Wc follow Mroz (1987) here, who
finds that the Tobit model is rejected in favour of a model with an unrestricted specification
for the participation decision (see also [3lundell et aL (1987)). We introduce a latent variable
pk that determines whether an individual wishes to participate (pk ~ 0) or not (pk G 0). The
participatíon equation is defined consistently with the hours equation
Pk - 7ok f 7t~k f 72~k f 73t~'k } Eyk. (Z)
with cyk i.i.d. error term with zero mean and ~ariance ap.
There are va.rious reasons why the hours decision rould be different frotn the participa[ion
decision and our specification allows for this. In fact we allow the labour supply function to be
discontinous at zero hours. ~Ve do not model explicitly the factors that may give rise to the
discontiimity. Structural models in which these factors are taken into account are for example
fixed cost models (cL Cogan (19R1)).
~Ve model variation in preferences across agents by making the parameters )3uk and yok
dependent upon age, family composition, behaviour of other individuals (interdependence of
preferences), and one's own past behaviour (habit formation).1
The influence of famil,y composition is modelled by means of demographic translating (cf.
Pollak and Wales ( 19R1)). The translation parame[ers ~3uk and yuk are made dependent upon
family size and the number of children ,younger than six. We model preference interdependence
and habit formation in the hours equation by making the parameter Ro~ also linearly dependent
upon actual hours worked by other working females in tPte reference group, lagged one period,
and upon the actual number of hours worked by the individual herself, lagged one period.
Analogously, the parameter ryu~ in the participation equation is made dependent upon the
actual participation rate of other females, lagged one period, and upon her own actual lagged
participation. This results in the following speciftcations
~Ok -~Ol } ~02f1k f QU3f2k ~ N04a2k f N05a3k f NO6a4k f Y07h~k(-1) f QOSShk(-1), (3~
i0k -~iol f ryn2Jlk ~ 7Q3J2k f 704a2k f 705a3k f 70ea4k f 707i~k(-f) ~ ry08SP~(-f~, l4)
where
h~;(-1) - lagged value of actual hours worked b,y the female in household k,
pk(-1) - lagged actual participation of the female in household k(0~1-variable),
ftk -(log of) family size oí household k,
JZk - dummy for the presence of children younger than six in household k,
azk - 1 if the female in household k is between 25 and 35 years old, 0 elsewhere,
aak - 1 if the female in household k is between 35 and 45 years old, 0 elsewhere,
aqk - 1 if the female in household k is older than 45 years, 0 elsewhere,
~hk(-1) - lagged value of the actual number of hours worked by females in the reference group
of the female in household k,
~yk(-1) - lagged value of the actual participation rate of females in the reterence group of the
female in household k,
and whcre ~u's aud ryo's are parameters.
The parameters ,QoB and -yo8 indicate the inftuence of reference group means on labour supply
behaviour. For example, po8 indicates the inFluence of the labour supply behaviour of females
in the reference group of k on the number of hours individual k would like to work. The
parameters pn; and ryu~ measure the inHuence of habit formation. The main empirical problem
in this specification is to find a sensible operationalization of the reference group variables tthk
and ~yk..3 Factor analytic model
Our data contain answers to a number of direct yuestions about reference groups of individuals.
The answers to the yuestions about reference groups are usecí to construct a number of indica-
tors oí the female participation rate and number of hours worked in the reference group of each
respondent. These indicators are next used in a factor analytic model to estimate the relation
of the indicators to the "true" participation rate and number of hours worked in the reference
group. These "true" variables can then be proxied on the basis of the observed indicators. The
proxies are used in the labour supply model.
P'or ease oí exposition we first present the yuestions that were asked in the survey about
one's reference groups.
]. "The following questions are about your social environment, that is people whom you
meet frequently, like friends, neighbours, acquaintances or possibly people you meet at
work. Thinking of the people in your social environment, can you indicate to which age
class they belong primarily?
Choose the answer which is most in accordance with reality."












[13 ] 71 and over
2. "What education level do most people in your social environment have? Check the
number corresponding with the answcr that comes closest to reality."
[1 ] primary education
[2 ] lower vocational education
[3 ] intermediate general education
[4 ] high school
[5 ] intermediate vocational education
[8 ] higher vocational education B.A. or B.SC.
[7 ] masters degreeThe decision to include these questions in the questionnaire was made in [he context of a
resea,rch project on subjective povert.y, where it was believed that the incomes and family com-
position of one's reference group are important determinants of one's subjective well-being. For
the purpose of explaining household labour supyly on the basis of preference interdependence
the yuestions suffer from one serious defect; no questions have been asked about the number
of hours worked or the participation rate in the reference group. Yet, we shall use the answers
to the aforementioned questions to construct indicators of the refereuce group means.
It seems reasonablc to suppose that an individual will primarily assign positive reference
weight to people whom she knows personally. lVithin the family we distinguish two channels
through which one can get to know other people. The first one is that one meets someone
directly. We assume that the people une meets are primarily pcople of about the same age and
education. 'The second charmel is that one meets someonc through one's partner. To formalise
this idea we construct four indicators of hours worked in a respondent's reference group. The
first indicator is simply the mean number of hours worked hy all working females in the popir
lation who share the characteristics education level and age bracket with the respondent. The
second indicator is the mean number of hours of all working females in the sarnple wlto have
the education level and age indicated by the respondent as typical for her reference group. The
third and fourth indicator are connected with people she meets through her husband. The third
indicator is the mean number of hours worked by all working females in the population who
share the characteristics education level and age brn~.l.rt with the husband of the respondent.
The fourt.h indicator is the mean number of hours of all working females in the sample who
have the education level and age indicated by the husband of the respondent as typical for his
reference group. For the partiripation rate in a respondent's reference group the indicators are
constructed analogously to the variables (or hours. Fur instance, the first indicator is the mean
participation rate of all females in the population who share the characteristics education level
and age bracket with the respondent.
Having constructed the indicators, how can we use them to find reasonable operationaliza-
tions of the "truè' reference group variables? Let r~ [hrough x~ be the indicators of hours
worked in the reference group of some respondent and let zs through ~8 be the indicators of
the participation rate. All indicators are taken as deviations from sample means. Furthermore,
let ~h and ~P be the "true" values in the reference group of the number of hours worked by
all working females and of the female participation rate respectively. Then we assume the
following relationships between these variables
~TI - niSh f VI,
r2 - a2~h f V2,
~3 - ~k3Sh f V3,
.T-f - ~4~h i- V.~.
(5)
where Vr through v4 are error terms with mean zero and joint diagonal variance-covariance
matrix ~h,~h is i.i.d. across individuals with mean zero and varia.nce wh, v's and {h are assumed
to be independeut, andxr - mean number of actual hours workod by all working females who are in the same age
and education bracket as the respondent,
xz - mean number of actual hours worked by all working temales who have the age and
education level indirated by the respondent as t,vpical for her reference group,
x;j - mean number of actual hours worked by all working fernales who are in the same age
and education bracket as the husband ofthe respondent,
x~ - mean numher of actual hours worked by all working females who have the age and
education level indicated hy the husband of the respondent as typical for }tis reference
group.
Technically, (5)-(8) is a factor analysis model, where ~h is the factor, ar through o4 are the
factorloadings, xr through x4 are the specific indicators.
For the participation rate a similar model is assumed
x5 - ~S~P ~ L5~
x6 - ~GSP } Utii
x7 - Ck7SP f U7.
x8 - QySP } U8~
(9)
(101
where the error terms vs to vs are error terms with mean zero and joint diagonal variance-
covariance matrix ~P and {P ís i.i.d. with mean zero and variance wy, U's and {P are assumed
to be independent, and
xs - mean actual patticipation rate of all females who are in the same age and education
bracket as the respondent,
zs - mean actual participa~tion rate of all females who have the age and education level indi-
cated by the respondent as typical for her reference group,
x~ - mean actual participation rate of all females who are in the same age and education
bracket as the husband of the respondent,
zs - mean actual participation rate of all females who have the age and education level indi-
cated by the husband of the respondent as typical for his reference group.
4 Data and estimation results of the factor analytic model
1'he data used come from the so-called Socio-Economic Panel (SGP), run by Statistics Nether-
lands. The SEP is a twice-a-year panel of households who are interviewed in April and October
of each year. The panel started in 1984. For the estimation of the labour supply model only
the wave of Octoher 1985 has been used since the questions used to construct reference groupsare a[ly asked in that wave. The data set used contains 422.5 households. In principle all
persons in a household of 16 years or older have been interviewed. "Phe information collec[ed
pertains primarily to income, labour market status, subjective evaluation of income, and var-
ious Lackground variables like household composition, education, etc It turns out that the
information for many households is incomplete, so tha,t a considerable amount of records had
to be removed. One of the most interesting features of these data are the questions about
reference groups, as described in Section 3. Another interesting feature is that respondents are
asked the number of hours they woulcl like to work, given their present after tax wage rate. It
is this variable that is used as a dependent variable in the labour supply modcl, the advantage
being that this variable is a pure suppl}' variable. Furthermore, the yuestion for desired hours
is framed in such a wa,y that it implies a linear budget constraint. The respondents were asked
the following yuestion: "Suppose that you can freely choose the number oí hours you work
per week. How many hours would you like to work in your present job, if you could choose
them yourself and if you would earn on average the same amount of money per hour as you do
now? If you choose fewer hours of work, you choose for less income. Assume that the number
of hours chosen by other members of the household, if any, docs not change". This wording
implies that the respondent is offered a linear budget constraint and is asked which number of
hours is optimal. Information on hours worked, wage rates and other important variables in
the sample is given in Table 1.
Table I: Sample means
variable all wanting to work
desired hours per week 7.78 20.77
actual hours per week, lagged 1 year 7.66 19.22
participation rate 0.37 1.00
participation rate,lagged 1 year 0.33 0.81
reference group mean of hours worked 2~L58
reference gronp mean of the participa[ion rate 0.47 0.62
actual net wage rate 13.77
predicted net wage rate 12.57 1 L57
Ievel of education 1, lowest level 0.19 0.13
level of education 2 0.34 0.29
level of education 3 0.36 0.4'2
level of education 4, highest level O.10 0.1 ï
age category, younger than 25 0.06 0.09
age category, 25-35 0.41 0.43
age category, 35-4.5 0.29 0.3~1
age category, older than 4.5 0.24 0.1.5
nonlabour income (guilders per week) 693.40 680.20
log of family size 1.20 1.10
dummy for presence of children younger than 6 years 0.57 0.35
number of individuals 977 366
~Thosc who are employed and say they want to continue working and those rwt working who say they are
looking for a job.We have estimated the factor analytic models for hours and participation rates separately.
Obviously, estimation of the two models for two-adult households with all the indicators in-
cluded requires that all questions have been answered by both spouses in the households. It
turns out, unfortunately, that the routing in the questionnaire ha5 been such that the ques-
tions have onl,y been asked to individuals who hace their own independent source of income.
As a result, the vast majority of observations had to be discarded for this part of the analysis,
including most households with nonworking housewives. For estimation only 272 households
remain. In the next section we show how we can nevertheless use all observations in the esti-
mation of the labour supply model. In 'Cable 2 the correlation matrices of the indicators are
given.
'I'able 2: Correlation matrices of inrlicators
hours
ri xz x3 x.;
xt 1 0.58 0.82 0.60




x5 xfi x7 xs
xs 1 0.90 0.75 0.95
xe 1 0.22 Q7Fi
x~ 1 0.38
xg 1
Table 3 presents the results of the factor analyses performed for hoars and particpation
rates respectively. 'rhe estimation method employed is maximum likelihood, using the well-
known LISREL program (Jdreskog (1973)). Strictly speaking, this im~olves the assumption of
mtiltivariate normality of all variables included. Especially, for the pa.rticipation equation this
can only be true as an approximation. We have made the identifying assumptions that both
factors have unit variance (wh -~y - 1).
Table 3: Pstimation results for the factor analytic models
hours participation rate
par. est. st.err. R; par. est. st.err. R.;
or 3.89 (0.38) 0.39 os 0.07 (0.01) 0.2.5
02 5.93 (0.34) 0.80 a~ 0.12 (0.01) 0.67
a3 2.91 (0.32) 0.29 0~ 0.05 (0.01) 0.16
a4 5.91 (0.33) 0.82 ct8 0.12 (0.01) 0.76
Rz 0.90 R2 0.83
The estimation results are satisfactory from a statistical viewpoint. The R~'s, indicating
the exteut of the correlation between the "true" reference group variables and the indicatorsIO
x; range from O.lfi to 0.82. 'I'he RZ's suggest that the indicators 12,r,t,rs and z8, that have
been based on the direct intormation about reference groups available in our survey do better
than the indicators xl,z3,zs and x7, that could be constructed in any survey. The model
R2's of 0.90 and O.R3 indicate a reasonable degree o( fit for the two models. The signs of the
a's are all positive, as one would hope, whereas thcir rnagnitudes are comparable. 'Che latter
fact suggests that the infonnational content of the indicators about the true reference group
variables is of similar magnitude, but of course not equal. (Otherwise, the indicators would
have shown perfect correlation). The standard errors are small, so that the a's have been
estimated wíth considerahle accuracy.
5 Estimation of the labour supply model
The true reference group meaus defined in Sectiar 3 cannot be observed directly. Hence, if
one wants to use these variables in the labour supply model it is necessary to replace the
true variables by proxies. It is well-known however that replacing unobscrvable variables in
a model by proxies may lead to inconsistent parameter estilnates. Furthermore, the number
of observations for which all indicators used in the factor analysis model are available is quite
sma1L Uasically, our solution amounts to the following. The proxies used for the unobservable
true reference group va.rlables are weiglded means of the indicators. Given the estima,t.PS nf the
factor analysis model, one can construct these means optimally, in the sense that a proxy gives
the best unbiased prediction of the corresponding true variable. Furthermore, the estimates of
the variances of the v's in the factor analysis tnodel can be used to compute the inconsistency
that would arise in estimation if the proxies were used in estimation of the labour supply
model without further precautions. As a result it is also possible to introduce a correction
which guarantees consistent (and actually eíflcient) estimates of all parameters. We will now
work this out in more detaiL
Combining (1) with (3) and (2) with (4) leads to
d C ` )
hk - Ok f~08Shk~- 1) f Ehk `13
d
Pk - ~k ~ yodEnk~- 1) } Epk ~14)
where
Ok - ~j01 f 1~02J1k f ~03J2k ~~04a2k f ~OSa3k f~O6a4k
f,~o~hk~-1) f i~l~k t Fjzwk f I3swk,
(15)
dk - 701 f 702I1k } 703I2k f T04~2k f i05a3k f 706a4k (16)
~'Y07J~k~-1) f 71~k f 72wk f Ï3wk~
xhk - ~h~hk f Uhk. ~17)tpk - `~y~yk ~ Upk,
Equations (}7) and (Ifi) are the factor analysis modcl (5)-(12) written in matrix format, .Ah
and Ap are column vectors of order 4, containing the a's. The first point to note is that the
wages are not observed for nonworkers. I3oth for workers and for non-workers wages are derived
from the wage eduation presented in Appendix .A. Secondly the latent variables ~hk and i;pk
are not observable, so that we cannot use (13) and (14) directly. Instead Of ~hk and irpk we
observe xhk aald xpk. "I'he way to get around the problem of not observing i;hk and á;yk is to
construct an expression of the expecta.tion of hk and pk conditional on xhk and xpk. In this
expression normality of all the variables involved is used heavily. The third point to note is
that if we want to use all observations in the estimation of (13)-(18) we will encounter many
cases where not all elements of the vectors x are observed. We therefore construct proxies for
the true variables that are op[imal given the amount of information available. Let zhk be the
subvector of xhk which is observable for household k. 'Chere holds
Zhk - ~hk~hk f Uhk (19)
wheCe rlhk IS the sUb-vf'ftor Of ráh forreSpOnding W'Íi}l Zhk aRd Uhk corresponds Wlth zhk as
well. The variance covariance matrix of the subwct~c ~f vhk is denoted by ~hk, the appropriate
submatrix of ~h.
We can now write down the expectation and variance of hk given ek and zhk and analogously
the expectation of pk given dk and apk. We obtain
E(hk I Ck,Zhk) - Ck f R08F(~hk I Ck,zhk) - Ck f~OSWh~hk(AhkWh~hk f~hk)-lzhk (20)
Var~hk I Ck,~hk) - ~h f Qo8(Wh - WhAhk(~hkwhAhk f~hk)-l~hkWh)QOtI (2I)
E(pk ~ ~k,Zpk) - (~k f ~YoB~(~Pk ~ dk,zpk) - dk ~70f1WP~~yk(~pkWp~pk ~ ~Yk)~IZpk (22)
L'(Lr(Pk I dk, ~yk) ~ Qp f ~io8(Wp - wP~Pk(aykWPApk } ~yk)-l ~pkWP)~ÍoB (23)
CJotice that, after the factor analysis model has been estimated, most of the qaantities
appearing in (20)-(23) are known, except the parameters inherent in ck and dk and ~e and
ry~. The statistical model then becomes:
Itk - F.(hk I Ck,~hk) ~ Elk If E(h k I Ck.-hk) i- Ek 1 O (i4)
pk -
and F,(pd ~ E~k, Zph ~ f E2h ~ ~
0 elsewhere
1 lf E~i~k ~ dk,Zph) } Elk 7 ~ (Z~ J)
~ if E~l~k I dk,~ph) f E2k C O.
where
hk - the observed number of hours an individuals desires to work
pk - 1 if the individual wants to participate
- 0 if the individual does not want to participate1'2
6 Estimation results for the labour supply model
~Indol (24)-(25) has been estimated by Maximum Likelihood on 977 observations of married
G~iuale~ in the SFP-data.
For the sake of cornparison we have also estimated a standard model without preference for-
mation. Table 4 presents the results. Let us first concentrate on the standard model of which
the results are given in the first column oí Table 4. We see that Camily size has a significant
negative effect on both the degree of participation ofmarried females and the number of hours
she woiild like to work. Also strong is the effect o( the presence of children younger than six in
both equations. Females work fewer hours and participate less if they age. Non-labour income
is shown to have a nega[ive efíect on working hours and on the particpation rate, implying
leisure to be a normal good. The labour supply curve is forward bending for wages below 24
guilders per hour. For higher wages it is backward bending. '1'he higher the expected wage
rate, the higher the participation rate for wages below 20 guilders per horv.
Next consider the extended model in which preference formation plays an important role.
Li the flexible specification, the wage variable turned out to have a negative effect on labour
snpply and the squared wage a positive. As a result of this, in almost 60~ of the observations,
the Slutsky conditions were violated. Therefore, we have presented here the linear specification.
The parauieter estimates of thc nonwagc ~ariables were rnnghly sin,ilar in hnth the line~r and
the quadratic specification. It is striking to see that especially the coefficients in the hours
eqnation change a iot. The effects oí family size and of the presence of children younger than
six become insignificant. Both the wage and the income effects bave decreased in size and are
insignificant. The age effect has also become much smaller, but is still significant. Habit for-
mation has a very significant positive effect on hours worked, and preference interdependence
has a sizeable positive, but insignificant, effect. In the participation equation the differences
between the standard and the extended model are less pronounced. Preference interdepen-
dence apparently pla.ys little role in the participa.tion decision, while habit formation (or state
dependence) has a strong e(fect.13
Table 4: Estimation results of the standard and extended model
hours equation
standard extended




























9.s4 (23.73) -0.22 (]s.42)
-zl.ss (3.11) -2.77 (2.07)
-13.19 (2.42) -0.83 (1.49)
-7.06 (3.42) -3.84 (1.56)
-10.71 (3.s5) -3.oa (2.11)
-22.08 (3.58) -4.43 (2.71)
0 (fixcd) 0.60 (0.04)
0 (fixed) 0.53 (0.65)
-0.0021 (o.oozs) -o.ooll (o.ools)
3.91 (3.91) 0.002 (0.015)
-o.as (o.is) o.oo (fixed)
1s.33 (0.71) 7.71 (0.21)
-1.96 (1.60) -3.66 (4.53)
-1.22 (o.ls) -n.al (o,ao)
-0.86 (0.13) -0.27 (0.22)
-0.08 (0.22) -0.29 (0.35)
-0.25 (0.24) -0.06 (0.44)
-0.99 (0.23) -0.51 (0.41)
0 (fixed) 2.74 (0.15)
0 (fixed) -0.05 (0.09)
-0.0003 (0.0001) -0.0003 (0.0003)
0.47 (o.2s) 0.~3 (o.7s)
-0.012 (0.010) -0.01 (0.03)
o.sa (o.ol) o.ss (o.os)
-1754.5 -1374.1la
'I'able 5: Estimation resiilts of variants of the extended model
only preference only habit
interdepondence formation
hours equation estimate standard estimate standard
error error
Qot (constant) -52.95 (27.30) -1.09 (4.07)
(ioy (family size) -19.68 (2.81) -2.86 (1.99)
po, (chila ~ 6) -ll.s7 (2.2s) -0.32 (l.as)
~3m (age 25-3.5) -3.58 (3.17) -3.92 (1.56)
Qos (age 35-95) -5.74 (3.45) -3.11 (1.82)
Qos (age ~ 45) -1.5.23 (3.74) -4.64 (2.37)
(3u~ (habit form.) 0 (fixed) 0.58 (0.04)
Qo8 (pref.int.) 3.00 (0.67) 0 (fixed)
pi (non-labour income) -0.0021 (0.002.5) -0.0012 (0.0018)
(j2 (wage) 1.63 (3.68) 0.14 (0.37)
~33 (wage-squared) -0.04 (0.14) 0 (fixed)
oh la.7s (o.s6) 7.s3 (o.ls)
participation equation
yo~ (constant) -1.93 (1.G4) -2.48 (4.08)
y02 (family size) -1.15 (0.19) -0.38 (0.33)
yo3 (child G 6) -0.85 (0.13) -0.37 (0.22)
ym (age 25-35) -0.10 (0.23) -0.0'2 (0.33)
yos (age 35-45) -0.25 (0.25) 0.41 (0.43)
yo~ (age ~ 45) -1.00 (0.2-1) OA6 (0.37)
yo~ (habit form.) 0 (fixed) 2.99 (0.14)
y~ (preCint.) -O.OOG (0.040) 0 (fixed)
yl (income) -0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0005 (0.0002)
yz (wage) o.4s (os7) o.la (0.70)
y3 (wa.ge-squared) -0.01`l (0.010) -0.0028 (0.03)
p (corr. coeff.) 0.57 (0.01) 0.53 (0.08)
log lik. -1744.0 -1398.8
These findings are corroborated by the results in Table .5. The estimation results of the model
in which only preference interdependence is taken into account (see Table 5 first column) show
us that it is habit formation and not preference interdependence that captures the effect of
family size on hours worked in the extended modeL Preference interdependence in this model
has a strong positive and significant effect in the hours equation, but hardly any effect in the
participation equation. This latter result is remarkable in that it is at variance with the model
put forward by Neumark and Postlewaite (1995). Column 2 of Table 5(only habit formation)
shows large positive significant effects of habit formation in both the hours equation and the
participation equation. Comparison of the log-likelihoods across the columns of Tables 4 and
5 shows that adding pteference interdependence to the standard model provides a statistically
significant improvement of the model (the log-likelihood rises from -1ï54.5 to -1744.0). The
addition of habit formation is much more important however (the log-likelihood for the second
column of Table 5 is equal to -1398.8 as compared to -1754.5 for the standard model). Still,
also after allowing for habit formation, preference interdependence significantly improves the1.5
model (the log-likelihood for the second column of Table 4 is -137-1.1, whereas the log-likelihood
for the second column of T'able 5 equals -139R.H, a difference of 24.7).
In empirical analyses not reported here, we have estimated "reduced form" variants of the
model, instrumenting the wage variable. The same effects with respect to preference formation
were found.
To give an idca of how well the extended model predicts labour supply behaviour, we present
graphs of observed and simulated hours distributions. In figure 1 the observed (desired) hours
distribution is confrontated with the hours distribution, simulated by the standard model.
Clearly, nonparticipation is overestimated, and the frequencies of positive houts per week are
underestirnated. In I'igure 2 the simulated hours distribution derived from the extended model
is shown. It fits the data much better. The YZ-statistic, calculated as squared difíerence
between the observed and simulated data, shows a reduction frorn 61.91 in the standard model
to 1.22 in the extended model.
Both in the standard and the extencíed model no observa,tions violate the Slutsky conditions.
The labour suppl,y curves and participation rates derived by averaging over all individuals are
shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 reveals a fiatter labour supply curve in the extended model
than in the standard model. Analogous results are found for the participation rates. We beGeve
that the wage effect is taken over by habit formation and preference interdependence. Just as
is the case with the effect of the presence of young children. One should note that these labour
supply curves are "short run' curves in the sense that all right haud sida variables, except the
wage, are kept constant. The models with habit formation and preference interdependence are
dynamic models, and hence it is also of interest to consider responses to changing wage rates
after more t.han one period.
In Ten Hacken, Iiapteyn and Woittiez (1989) simulations are performed with a comparable
model with habit formation and preference interdependence. They link the micro model with
a macro model and simulate changes in the welfare system. They find that "the direct effect of
the reduction of benefits is an increase in the willingness to work for those who are currently
receiving a benefit. Due to habit formation and preference interdependence, it takes a number
of years before the full effect of the policy change has materialized."
Ilere we also use our estimated models to carry out sorne simulations-. In particular, we sim-
ulate the short term and long terrn effect. of wage increases. To this end, we increase all wages
b,y 10 ~ and simulate participa[ion and hours worked after one period. These simulated values
are next fed into the right ha.nd side of the hours and participation equations and we simulate
hours and participation in the next period. We continue this process tmtil convergence. In the
sinmlations it has been assumed that desired hours and participation can be realized without
delay (i.e. there is no invcluntary unemployment or other demand side restrictions). We sum-
marize the ~tggregate effects of the simulations by presenting the effects on average hours and
participation in the form of elasticities.a
'Given that we consider the effect of an across the board wage increase by 10 ~lo this means that we simply
divide the calculated percentage changes by ten.1fi
Table 6: Elasticities of hours and participation with respect to wages
standard extended only pref.int. only habit form.
ST LT ST Cf ST L'I'
positive hours -1.97 0.08 0.61 -1.99 0.11 0.15 O.ltl
participation ï.0ï 0.00 0.19 6.93 0.17 0.00 0.04
Table 6 gives the results. One should note that the elasticities of hours only refer to mean
hours for those who work. A negative sign for an elasticity may therefore occur in cases where
participation goes up quite a bit, where the new entrants work few hours. This then depresses
the mean.
In the extended model, the short term effects of a wage increase on hours worked and
participation are lower than the long term effects. But the long term effects are still much
lower than the wage effects in the standard modeL The short term effects in the model with
only preference interdependence resemble the effects in the standard modeL A strong positive
effect on participation and a strong negative effect on hours worked. But after only a few
periods, preference interdependence results in small positive effects on both hours worked and
participation.
7 Conclusion
The modelling of preference formation has been the major point of emphasis in this paper.
1'o that end we have constructed reference group means of hours worked and the participation
rate on the basis of a factor analysis model. We have employed different pieces of information
available in the data set to construct latent variables which may be thought to be a more
accurate reflection of the notion of reference group means than the ones used in Kapteyn and
Woittiez (1990). The factor analytic model, which relates these índicators to the "true" refer-
ence group means suggests that the indicators based on direct information by the respondents
about their reference groups perform better than indirect indicators which we constructed our-
selves. Unfortunately, due to a particular routing in the questionnaire, the direct indicators of
reference groups are onl,y available for a relatively small part of the data. This has undoubtedly
reduced the significance of the reference group variables in the labour supply and participation
equations.
The estimation results indicate that the incorporation oí preference formation leads to
difíerent couclusions than would otherwise obtain. One of the most interesting features of the
model is that incorporating preference formation leads to a large decrease in the effects of the
presence of young children on hours worked. Also, the wage effects on labour supply become
srnadler. Preference formation contributes significantly to the explanation of desired hours. The
fit of the model increases significantly by incorporating preference fonnation.
At the same time, it becomes clear that despite our potentially better operationalization of
reference group variables than in earlier work, most of the improvement in model fit is caused
by habit formation and a relatively small (but significant) part by preference interdependence.
Although this may indicate a more important role for state dependence in the explanation
of labour s~~pply, one can only be sure about this, once better indicators of reference group
variables are available.17
Not only would one like to have direct measures for every respondent (rather than (or a
rclatively small part of the sample), but also it would be irnportactt to ask direct, questions
about participation and hours worked in one's social envimnmeut. In the current analyses
these variables still had to be constructed in a somewhat roundabout manner.
Appendix A. The wage equation
The imputed wages that have been used in the labout supply equation and the participation
eyuation have been derived from the estimated wage equation shown in Table 8. To cope with
possible sample selection bias we have used Heckman's two-step procedure. In Table 7 the
estimation results ot the participation equation are shown.
Except for the age variables most coefficients in the participation equation are significant
and have the expected sign. The participation rate increases with the level of education and
decreases with the presence of children. The younger the children the larger this effect. The
income effect on participation is negative. The more experienced one is, the higher the partic-
ipation rate. The composite effect of education in the wage equation is positive, except for the
third level. The variables child G 6 and child ~ 12 are proxies for a(temporary) career break
of women. They both have a negative effect on the wage rate. The significantly positive coeffi-
aent on Heckman's lambda indicates a positive cur,elatiou between unmeasured inftuences on
the participation probability and the wage rate.
Table 7: The participation eyuation4
variable estimate standard error
constant -1.92 (1.29)
familysize -0.51 (0.2ï)
child G 6 -1.56 (0.2'2)
child 1 12 -0.74 (0.21)
age 25-35 -0.08 (0.26)
age 35-45 -0.04 (0.40)
age ~ 45 -0.01 (0.52)
level of edua 2 0.10 (0.14)
level of educ. 3 0.42 (0.14)
level of educ. 4 0.94 (0.19)
experience 0.19 (0.07)
experience-squared -0.0029 (0.0009)
non-labour income -0.0003 (0.0002)
log likelihood -481.88
~Experience is defined as age minus the number of years o[ education -6.18
Table 8: The wage equation (dependent variable is log wa.ge rate)
variable estimate standard error
constant L10 (1.12)
child G 6 -0.48 (0.24)
child ~ 12 -0.33 (0.1~t)
level of educ. 2 -1.66 (1.23)
level of educ. 3 -0.55 (1.13)
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